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Edward P. Lazear 
When wages equal marginal product and workers are risk neutral, sever- 
ance pay is not merely superfluous-it  is harmful. However, when either 
of  these conditions is violated severance pay becomes an important part 
of an optimal  compensation  scheme. For example,  if  the contempo- 
raneous wage exceeds marginal product then workers prefer to remain 
with the firm even when it is inefficient to do so. Severance pay causes the 
worker to leave the job more frequently, and a judiciously chosen com- 
bination  of  wage  and severance pay  can induce efficient  quitting be- 
havior. 
Pensions which vary with the date of retirement can be thought of as a 
form of  severance pay.  If  the expected present  value of  the pension 
declines with later retirement, then the worker sacrifices some benefits to 
remain on the job. Stated conversely, firms appear to be willing to pay a 
larger pension value (stock, not flow, of  course) to workers who retire 
early. These larger pensions can be interpreted as severance pay because 
they induce the worker to leave the job more frequently than he would in 
the absence of  such a structure. 
This view of  pensions is quite different from the one that holds that 
pensions are a way to save at before-tax rather than after-tax rates of 
interest. Although there must be some truth to the notion that pensions 
function as a tax-free savings account, this view alone is inconsistent with 
the finding (presented below) that the expected value of  the pension 
stream declines with increased age of retirement. Since nothing is with- 
drawn explicitly from the account until retirement, the value of pension 
benefits should be strictly increasing with age of  retirement under the 
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savings account interpretation of pensions. The widespread existence of 
pensions which decline with age of retirement is evidence for the notion 
that pensions  act as a form of  severance pay to ensure efficient labor 
mobility. 
Below, a theory of severance pay is presented and specific implications 
of that theory to pensions are derived. The theory is tested using data 
which I generated using the 1980  Bankers’ Trust Corporate Pension Plans 
Study. The results are then compared to those obtained using a similar 
data set for 1975 which was analyzed in a previous study (Lazear 1982). 
The major findings are: 
1. Although severance pay does not always guarantee efficient labor 
mobility, appropriately chosen severance pay moves the economy in the 
direction of the perfect information optimum under almost all circum- 
stances. 
2.  Most  major pension plans in  both 1975 and 1980 paid  a larger 
expected present value of  pension benefits for early retirement. This is 
consistent with the view that pensions act as severance pay but incon- 
sistent with the notion that pensions are merely a tax-deferred savings 
account. 
3. The structure  of pensions between 1975  and 1980 does not appear to 
have changed  dramatically. Either ERISA’s (1974) effect was almost 
fully captured by the 1975 data or it did not have a significant effect on 
pension values. 
4.  There was about a 50% increase in the average nominal value of 
pensions across the board between 1975 and 1980. Additionally, there 
was over a 100% increase in the value of pensions taken 10 years before 
the date of  normal retirement for pattern skews. This may have been a 
reaction to changes in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act which 
restricted mandatory retirement clauses. 
The Model 
The first task is to derive a simple model of  severance pay.’  To begin, 
consider a two-period world in which workers are risk neutral. The terms 
of trade between the worker and firm are set in period 0 and work, if it 
occurs at all, takes place during period  1. For the moment, we do not 
elaborate the reasons for setting up a contractual arrangement when a 
spot market might appear to perform as well or better. Simply take the 
two-period construct as given. 
Define the wage at which trade occurs in period 1 as W,  the worker’s 
value to  the firm as V,  and the value of his alternative use of time as A.  If 
work takes place, the worker receives W,  but work does not occur in the 
event of  a “quit” or ‘‘layoff,’’  each of  which is determined unilaterally. A 59  Pensions as Severance Pay 
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worker quits if and only if A >  W and the firm lays the worker off if and 
only if  V<  W. 
Work  is  efficient  whenever  A <  V. Under  these  circumstances, 
appropriate transfers could make all parties better off if  work occurs. But 
if  W equals neither A  nor, V,  work  will  not  always occur when  it  is 
efficient. To see this, consider figure 3.1. Work is efficient whenever the 
realization of V,  A lies to the southeast of  the A = V line. Suppose that 
the wage which is negotiated is W.  The worker quits whenever A >  W or 
whenever the realization of A is above the horizontal line at W.  Some of 
these quits are efficient since the worker quits when A >  W >  V and when 
A >  V>  W,  both of which imply that A >  V so that the separation should 
occur. But some of those quits are inefficient since the worker also quits 
when  V>A  >  W.  These points are shown in the triangle labeled “in- 
efficient quits.” The problem is that the worker can unilaterally deter- 
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mine a separation and he has no incentive to take into account the fact 
that although his alternatives are relatively good, he is worth even more 
to society at his current job. 
The converse is also true. The firm unilaterally determines that a layoff 
occurs whenever  V<  W.  In  the diagram, layoffs  occur  whenever  the 
realization of V is to the left of the vertical line at V = W. Some of these 
layoffs are efficient because the firm lays the worker off when W>A  >  V 
and when A >  W>  V,  both of which imply that A >  V.  Thus a separation 
should occur. But some are inefficient because the firm also lays workers 
off when W>  V>A,  shown in the triangle labeled “inefficient layoffs.” 
The problem here is that the firm can unilaterally determine a separation, 
and it has no incentive to take into account the fact that although the 
worker is worth little to the firm his alternative use of time is even lower. 
Labor market situations seem to resemble this simple set-up. Workers 
have better information about their alternatives than firms and firms have 
better information about the worker’s worth to the firm than the worker. 
Wages or wage profiles are somewhat rigidly fixed in advance so that the 
bilateral monopoly situation which arises after the value of A and I/ are 
known does not lead to costly negotiation about how rent is to be split. 
Now consider the role of severance pay. Suppose that the agreement 
which is negotiated  at time zero includes the provision that work takes 
place at wage W, but that a payment S is made from firm to worker if a 
separation occurs.’ The worker quits if and only if A + S>  W or if  and 
only if A >  W  ~  S. The firm lays the worker off if and only if W -  V>  S or 
if  and only if  V>  W -  S. 
If  both W and S are free to vary, severancc pay adds nothing to the 
analysis. We can simply define W* = W -  S and the previous discussion 
carries over perfectly to this case as well. 
Severance pay is interesting when W or S is not free to vary so that the 
wage that minimizes the loss due to inefficient separation either is not 
feasible or is undesirable by  some other criterion. In the static context, 
the  division  of  rent  provides  a  motivation  for  a  separate wage  and 
severance pay. Since V>  A automatically implies that rent is generated as 
the result of trade, that rent must be split up. It is desirable that the way in 
which  rent  is  shared should  not  affect  the allocation of  resources. A 
two-part wage is sufficient to bring this about. The worker receives Seven 
if no work occurs, so W -  S is the marginal payment for work and it is this 
value that affects behavior. 
For example, suppose that V=  v were  known  with  certainty  by  all 
parties. Then ifg(A) is the density of A,  the expected rent associated with 
the activity is v -  JFZ  A g(A)dA  if no inefficient separation occurs. This 
value can be realized only if work occurs whenever A <  v.  If the marginal 
payment to work is set equal to v,  a layoff never occurs and quits occur if 
and only if A >  v.  Thus, W-  S = v  is efficient. The split of  the rent is a 61  Pensions as Severance Pay 
bargaining problem, but it is clear that any level of S chosen is consistent 
with W -  S = v  because W  is free to vary. Thus, the rent-sharing arrange- 
ment pays S and the additional degree of  freedom provided by W ensures 
separation efficiency. 
A pension can be thought of as this most simple form of severance pay. 
After signing the contract (becoming vested, perhaps), the worker can 
quit and receive the pension S,  or he can continue to work in which case 
he receives W-  S for work plus a pension of S upon retirement. Below, 
we enrich the definition of severance pay to encompass the more elabo- 
rate forms that pensions take, but the simple notion that a pension may 
function as a form of severance pay remains. 
In this static context, the timing of S is inconsequential. It can be paid 
during period zero or after period one so that the term “severance pay” 
may be somewhat misleading. In the dynamic context, the timing of the 
payment may be crucial. The fact that contracts are not costlessly en- 
forced seems to be a major part of  the story and it is this aspect of the 
problem that makes it necessary that the lump sum part of payment, the 
severance pay, be paid after employment ceases. 
One situation in which it is important that severance pay follow em- 
ployment arises when effort cannot be monitored costlessly. As has been 
argued elsewhere (Becker and Stigler 1974; Lazear 1979,1981), deferred 
compensation can act as an incentive device to bring about an efficient 
amount of  effort on the job. A  pension  given on retirement may  be 
regarded as a reward for service well done, and the existence of  such a 
reward induces workers to avoid shirking over their work lives. But a 
pension awarded only on retirement is not, in general, the best way to 
produce this result. I have shown that under a number of circumstances it 
is  preferable to combine  some pension  on  retirement with  an  age- 
earnings profile which rises more rapidly than worker productivity. 
The difficulty associated with steeply rising age-earnings profiles is that 
they distort the labor supplyiseparation decision. Mandatory retirement 
is one institutional adaptation which has arisen to alleviate the harmful 
effects of that distortion. But the problem is one  which affects the worker 
and firm in all periods of  their partnership and is not specific to retire- 
ment. In the vocabulary of the earlier discussion, if  Wexceeds V, then the 
worker will not leave the job when it is efficient for him to do  so. The firm, 
on the other hand, is too anxious to rid itself of the worker. If  Vis known 
to both worker and firm, then it is easy to set up an arrangement that will 
guarantee both optimal  effort  and  efficient  separation. That scheme 
involves the use of  an upward-sloping  age-earnings profile with  some 
pension after retirement at the normal age. All separations are initiated 
by workers except in the case of  effort below the required level. Under 
that circumstance, the worker is fired and loses the right to draw high 
future  salary and perhaps some pension device since the expected present 62  Edward P.  Lazear 
value of the pension, and therefore of the severance pay, varies with age 
of retirement. Let us formalize the approach. 
We broaden our model to consider a situation in which workers remain 
with a particular firm for a number of periods. Define T as the period of 
“normal” retirement. (As will be argued below, “normal” retirement is 
nothing more than the modal age of retirement because, with efficient 
severance pay, workers leave the firm appropriately.) A typical profile 
with wage not equal to marginal product is shown in figure 3.2. Here 
wage, labeled W,  starts out below worker’s marginal product, V,  and 
then rises above it. The distortion occurs because the worker reacts to the 
relationship between his alternative, A,  and W,  rather than to the rela- 
tionship between his alternative, A,  and marginal product, V.  Severance 
pay can eliminate the distortion. 
Utility maximization implies that a worker quits and accepts severance 
pay if two conditions hold: (1)  the present value of severance pay plus the 
alternative stream exceeds the present value of  the wage stream in the 
current firm and (2) the worker cannot do even better by  delaying his 
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where K is the number of  years beyond normal retirement age that the 
individual lives, S, is the annual pension payment received from t until 
death if the worker retires at t,  and r is the discount rate. 
To induce efficient quitting behavior, it is necessary that the 1.h.s.  of (1) 
exceeds the r.h.s. of  (1) if  and only if  ATpl  >  VTp1.  If  PT-l =  STPI 
2,"=:: 1  /( 1 + r)'  and PT =  ST C:=,  1  /( 1 + r)', then choose PT and Pr-  so 
that 
PT-1- ($+=  WPI  -  VT- 1. 
Substitution of (2) into (1) yields the necessary and sufficient condition 
that the worker quits if 
AT- 1 + WT- 1 -  Vr-  1 > WT- 1 
or 
(3)  AT-I>VT-I. 
Since this is the efficiency condition,  the severance pay  arrangement 
results in efficient turnover. 
Now consider that decision at T- 2. The worker resigns at T- 2 if and 
only if two conditions hold: First, the present value of  retiring at T- 2 
and receiving severance pay must exceed the present value of continuing 
to work until  T- 1 and retiring then, taking the T- 1 severance pay. 
Second, the present value of  retiring at T- 2 with severance pay must 
exceed  the present  value  of  working  until  T  and taking  the normal 
pension.  If  we  make the assumption that A,  >  V, implies A,, >  V,, for 
t' >  t, then  the  second  condition  becomes  redundant  (demonstrated 
below). 
Consider the first condition: A worker retires at T -  2 rather than at 
T -  1 if and only if 
where ET - ,(Ar  - 1) is the expectation of  the alternative wage offer at 
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For efficiency, it is necessary that the 1.h.s. of  (4) exceed the r.h.s. if 
and only if AT-,  > VTP2  (which by  assumption, implies AT- I > VT-1). 
An efficient pension plan sets 




To see this, substitute (5)  into (4).  The worker opts to leave if and only if 
(6)  AT-2 + WT-2 -  VT-2 >  WT-2 
or if  AT-2 > VTP2,  which is the efficiency condition. 
Note also that if ATP2  > VTP2,  the worker chooses retirement at T- 2 
over  retirement  at  T. The  second  condition  is  redundant.  Since 
Ar-2 > VT-  2  implies AT-  > vT-  the efficient pension  plan  already 
ensures that inequality (3) holds as well. Since the efficient pension at 
T- 1 induced retirement at T- 1 whenever AT-, > VT-  it is clear that 
retirement at T- 2 dominates retirement at T- 1. 





The terminal value, PT,  is exogenous to this problem. It might be the 
optimal pension to prevent shirking in the final period before retirement 
or simply a rent-sharing parameter. 
It is through equations (7) and (8) that we derive our results. If the 
wages of old workers exceed their marginal products, then the present 
value of the pension falls as the age of retirement rises (eq. [7]).  Similarly, 
equation (7) provides us with an estimate of  the difference between W 
and V at each point in time because PTP,  and PTPi+  are observed. 65  Pensions as Severance Pay 
The case of  postponed retirement is equivalent. Normal retirement is 
not  special  once  we  allow  pension  benefits to vary  with  the date of 
retirement. The date of  “normal retirement” is likely to be the date of 
modal retirement. In almost all cases that age is 65 and corresponds to the 
start of  social security payments because the social security earnings test 
causes the A([)  function to take a discrete jump upward at age 65. Except 
for this detail, the analysis of postponed retirement is similar. The work- 
er’s choice is still reflected by (1) so all holds as above with a replacement 
of  subscripts. If j is the number of  years after normal retirement, then 
retirement occurs if and only if 
Equations (7), (7’),  and (8) follow correspondingly, so that an estimate of 
W -  V can be obtained for those years after T as well by examining the 
way in which pension benefits decline in late retirement. 
Let us summarize this section. The pension which acts as severance pay 
reduces the true wage to V when we take into account the way that the 
pension value falls with experience. Since the pension is not paid if the 
separation is punishment for too little effort, incentives are maintained 
while efficient turnover is produced. Employers are willing to buy out of a 
long term contract  if  the wage rate exceeds VMP. The amount that 
employers  are willing to pay  reveals  something about the difference 
between  W and V.  Pensions may  act as a buyout.  If  the value of the 
pension declines with the age of retirement, this suggests that the pension 
plays the role of  severance pay. 
3.1.1 
The model discussed earlier allowed V to be random and unknown by 
both parties.  Under these circumstances, one instrument-in  this case 
the pension  stream P(t)-is  not  sufficient  to eliminate  all inefficient 
separation. The reason is that when the firm uniquely knows the value of 
the worker to  the firm, the only way to make that information useful is to 
give the firm some discretion  over when work occurs. But to do this 
immediately creates a problem, because the firm is  anxious to sever 
the  worker  whenever  V<  W- S.  This  leads  to  situations  where 
A <  V<  W -  S, so that a layoff occurs when a separation is inefficient. 
The introduction of  a second instrument can alleviate some of  this 
difficulty. If different amounts of severance pay are paid depending  upon 
who initiates the separation, some inefficient  layoffs and quits can be 
eliminated. This raises two difficulties. First, it creates a situation where 
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each side tries to induce the other to initiate the separation. Second, 
it  generates  inefficient  retention  as  a  biproduct.  This  occurs  when 
W -  L <  V<A  <  W -  Q, where Q is what is paid to the worker as sever- 
ance pay if the worker initiates the separation and L is what is paid to the 
worker if  the firm initiates the separation. If  L=  (z this condition can 
never hold, but for L >  Q,  inefficient retention occurs. This is discussed in 
depth in Hall and Lazear (1982). It is also shown that it is never optimal to 
select  L <  Q  because  this  results  in  needless  inefficient  separations. 
Perhaps because of  these difficulties and those associated with determin- 
ing who actually initiated the separation, pensions rarely vary with the 
identity of the initiating party. 
3.1.2  Vesting 
Vesting is an issue that always arises when pensions are discussed. This 
seems especially relevant when one of the arguments for incorporating a 
pension into the generalized compensation plan relates to incentives for 
increased  effort  or reduced turnover.  It is  sometimes  suggested  that 
nonvested pensions can reduce worker turnover whereas vested pensions 
cannot. The model in the previous section should make clear that “vest- 
ing” in and of  itself has little meaning. 
Vesting  guarantees  that  a  worker  is  entitled to  receive  currently 
accrued  benefits. But currently  accrued  benefits  may be small indeed 
until the last few years before retirement. There are a number of reasons 
which all derive from the large number of degrees of freedom inherent in 
setting up a benefit formula. First, many benefit formulas depend upon 
final salary or an average of salaries earned in the last few years before 
retirement. Because salary grows with age and, in an inflationary period, 
with chronological time, the benefits received by a worker who leaves the 
firm at age 30 may be much  smaller than those received  by  the same 
worker if he leaves at age 65. Second, because length of  service affects 
benefits,  formulas can be specified  to make the accrual  rate a convex 
function of  years of  service, placing a premium on long tenure. Third, as 
Bulow points out, a worker who is vested but below the age at which early 
retirement  benefits  can  be  received  earns a promise  of  a pension  at 
normal  retirement  age,  not  the benefits  themselves.  Because  of  the 
higher value of pensions taken on early retirement, remaining with the 
firm at least until the age of early retirement election is generally lucra- 
tive. 
In the same vein, the tendency of many plans to gear pension benefits 
to final salary is evidence for the incentive role of pensions. Most other 
rationalizations for pensions (discussed below) at best gear pensions to a 
lifetime  average rather than to an average of final salaries. Since final 
salary can be adjusted to reflect worker effort, hours worked, and pro- 
ductivity, the multiplier effect on the pension  value  may provide  sig- 67  Pensions as Severance Pay 
nificant incentives for workers to maintain effort and a high level of hours 
worked during those final years. 
3.2  The Empirical Analysis 
3.2.1  Data 
The data for this  analysis were  constructed using two sources: the 
Bankers’ Trust Study of  Corporate Pension Plans 1975 and the Bankers’ 
Trust Corporate Pension Plan Study (1980).  Each of these studies consists 
of a detailed verbal description of  the pension plans of over 200 of  the 
nation’s largest corporations. The data sets apply to approximately 8-10 
million workers, and this comprises about one-fourth of  the entire cov- 
ered population. 
Firms are not identified by name in the descriptions. However, enough 
detail is given about each firm so that it is possible to match up firms in the 
1975 and 1980 samples. For example, the descriptions report the industry 
in  which  the firm produces,  the date at which  the pension plan was 
adopted and amended, and the number and types of employees covered 
by the plan. Screening on the basis of these and other criteria resulted in a 
longitudinal data set of  70 matched firms for the two years in addition to 
the two cross sections of 200+  firms for each year. 
The major empirical task was to convert the verbal descriptions into 
machine-readable data. This required setting up a coding system that was 
specific enough to capture all of the essential detail associated with each 
plan. It was  then  necessary  to write  a program  which calculates  the 
present value  of  pension  benefits  at each age of  retirement. A  brief 
summary of  that approach follows. 
Pension benefit formulas assume three different types. The two most 
common fall under the rubric of  defined-benefit plans. A defined-benefit 
plan specifies the pension flow as a fixed payment determined by  some 
formula. The pattern plan awards  a flat dollar amount per year worked to 
the recipient on retirement. The conventional plan calculates the pension 
benefit flow from a formula which depends on years of service and some 
average salary. In contrast to the defined-benefit plans are the defined- 
contribution plans in which the employer (or employee) contributes a 
specified amount each year during the work life to a pension fund. The 
flow of  pension benefits that the worker receives upon retirement is then 
a function of  the market value of  that fund. The defined-contribution 
plan is much less frequently used than is either the pattern plan or the 
conventional plan. 
In order to test the theory exposited above, it is necessary to obtain 
estimates  of  the expected  present value  of  pension benefits  for each 
potential year of retirement. Specifically, the way in which pension values 68  Edward P.  Lazear 
vary with age of retirement must be calculated. Some  plans do  not permit 
the individual to receive early retirement benefits or only permit early 
retirement up to a given number of years before the normal date. This 
means that in order to perform the necessary comparisons, sometimes 
plans had to be deleted from the relevant sample so that the entire series 
of  retirement values would be valid. 
It  is important  to  realize  that there are no  real  individuals in  this 
sample. Since the data sets discussed above are descriptions of  pension 
plans, the “individuals” below are hypothetical ones, created to perform 
the necessary simulation exercises. For each plan, for each of  the two 
years, 12 “typical” employees were created, having all combinations of 
salary on normal retirement of  $9,000, $15,000, $25,000 and $50,000 and 
of tenure of  10,20, and 30 years in 1975 and 20,30, and 40 years in 1980. 
Much of the analysis below relates to these 2,928 “individuals” from 244 
plans in 1975 and to the 2,712 “individuals” from the 226 plans in  1980. 
Because this simulation exercise was computationally expensive, a repre- 
sentative group was selected having salary of  $25,000 and tenure of  30 
years on normal  retirement. Many  of  the comparative  statics results 
below are derived from an examination of  the individuals in this repre- 
sentative sample. 
In order to calculate the expected present value of retirement at each 
age, two steps must be taken. First, for any hypothetical employee, the 
pension flow that he receives on retirement in any given year must be 
calculated. Second, that flow must be converted into an expected present 
value  by  discounting it  appropriately  and  by  taking into account  the 
age-specific death rates. Even the first step is far from straightforward. 
Most plans have many restrictions on the maximum amount which can 
be accrued, and many provide for minimum benefits.  Additionally, a 
number reduce pension benefits by some fraction of  the social security 
benefits to which some basic class is  entitled. Moreover, a number of 
plans provide supplements for retirement before the social security eligi- 
bility age. Sometimes these supplements relate directly to social security 
payments; at other times they depend on the individual’s salary or benefit 
level. 
Other restrictions  have  to do with  vesting  requirements, with  the 
maximum age at which the individual begins employment, and with the 
minimum number of  years served before the basic accrual or particular 
supplements are applicable. The accrual rate, or flat dollar amount per 
year to which the individual is entitled, is often a nonlinear function of 
tenure and salary,  and  these  kinks  had  to be  programmed  into the 
calculations. 
In calculating retirement benefits, assumptions about wage growth for 
older workers are crucial. All plans which arc based on salary compute 
some average of annual earnings over some relevant period. Therefore, it 69  Pensions as Severance Pay 
is nominal earnings growth that will affect the pension values. Elsewhere 
(Lazear 1981) I estimated earnings growth and found something that is 
well known among labor economists: earnings growth is often negative in 
final years because hours of work decline (primarily for health reasons) in 
the final years before retirement. In the sample I examined, based on 
CPS data from the mid  1970s, the estimate of  earnings growth  for a 
particular synthetic cohort was anywhere from -  2% to -13%  depend- 
ing on how the sample was selected. Because more rapid wage growth 
will tend to make pension values increase with the age of  retirement, 
selecting higher rates of wage growth tends to push the results against the 
theory of this chapter. To be conservative, I selected a wage growth rate 
of zero for most of the analysis and also recalculated pension benefits with 
a growth rate of positive 5%,  well above that actually observed in the 
data. 
Since all values are nominal, the nominal interest rate should be used 
as the discount factor. For most of the analysis 10% was used, but 15% 
and 5% were also tried in order to ascertain the sensitivity of the results to 
the choice of discount rate. Although varying the rates had some effects, 
it did not alter the qualitative conclusions. 
Finally,  in  performing  the actuarial correction,  it was necessary to 
choose a life table. The 1975 life table for Americans was used for the 
1975 sample and the 1978 table was used for the 1980 sample. Both were 
obtained from the U.S.  Vital Statistics. The choice of table turns out to be 
the least crucial part of the analysis. Values do not vary greatly from year 
to year and discounting makes what small differences there are unimpor- 
tant. What is important, however, is the possibility that early retirees do 
not have the same life expectancy of normal retirees. It is likely that many 
individuals retire early as the result of poor health and consequently have 
higher age-specific death rates. If this is true, then ignoring those differ- 
ences will tend to bias the results in the direction of higher pension values 
for early retirees than is actually the case. 
3.2.2  Findings 
We start by  discussing  the data from  the  1980 sample.  Table 3.1 
contains some descriptive statistics. Notice that there is a tremendous 
amount of variation in the present value of pension benefits even within 
each salary-tenure group. For all “workers” taken together the standard 
deviation is as large as the mean. Within each salary-tenure group, the 
standard deviation is around half of  the mean. A simple rule of thumb 
suggests that the mean  pension  value  is  about one-thirteenth of  the 
product of final salary and tenure at retirement. It is somewhat more than 
this for very low-salary workers and slightly less than this for high-salary 
workers. This reflects the provisions for both maximum and minimum 
pension values which make the benefit structure progressive. 70  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 3.1  1980 Data: Moments of the Expected Present Value of  Normal 
Retirement Benefits 
(Sample Selection Criterion: EPV -  0 Valid) 
Tenure  Standard 

































































Before  going further, it  is interesting to compare this to the cross 
section from 1975. Those data are presented in table 3.2. Although the 
average pension value is smaller in 1975 than in 1980, this is the result of 
differences across groups. The 1975 data are constructed using hypothet- 
ical workers with 10,20,  and 30 years of tenure, whereas the 1980 data are 
constructed  using  hypothetical workers  with  20,  30, and  40 years  of 
tenure. In fact, within each comparable salary-tenure group, the values 
Table 3.2  1975 Data: Moments of  Expected Present Value of  Normal 
Retirement Benefits 
(Sample Criterion: EPV -  0 Valid) 
Tenure  Standard 
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for 1975 are significantly higher than those for 1980. We defer until later 
discussion of the reasons for this pattern. Another interesting difference 
is that the pattern is significantly less progressive in 1975 than in 1980. In 
1975, the rule  that the pension  value  equals  about one-tenth of  the 
product of final salary and tenure seems to hold across all salary levels 
with only slight traces of progressivity. 
These findings do not suggest that pensions were larger in 1975 than in 
1980. There are two main reasons: First, firms are not matched across 
years in these tables, so that some of the difference may simply reflect 
random  sample  variations.  Second, final  salaries  were  substantially 
higher in 1980 than in 1975, so the relevant comparison is not necessarily 
the one that holds salary level constant. 
In the context of the model, the most important results relate to the 
way  in which  pension values vary  with  the age of  retirement. Tables 
3.3-3.5 select those “individuals” in the 1980  sample who were permitted 
to retire  at least  10 years before the normal age and trace the mean 
present value of pensions for that group. EPV -  10 refers to the expected 
present value of  retiring 10 years before the normal age, and similarly for 
EPV -  9 . . . EPV -  1.  EPV -  0 is the present value of retiring at normal 
age. The tables are broken down by pension benefit formula type and 
then by salary and tenure level. 
First examine table 3.3, which relates to conventional plans. Note that 
for all tenure-salary groups, the value of early retirement exceeds that of 
normal retirement (EPV -  10 >  EPV -  9 > . . . >  EPR -  1 >  EPV -  0). 
For  ease of  reading,  ERAT(t) is  defined  as  EPV(t)/EPRO,  so  that 
ERAT  >  1  for all c <  0. This  evidence supports  the major prediction of the 
model: The expected present value of pension benefits declines as the age 
of  retirement increases. Firms actually do “buy out” workers who retire 
early with higher pensions. As such, the interpretation that pensions act 
as severance pay is consistent with these results. 
Further, ERAT -  10 increases with tenure and salary. The buy-out is 
larger, not only in absolute terms, but also in relative terms for employees 
of  longer  service  and of  higher  salaries. This  is  consistent  with  the 
interpretation that an upward-sloping  age-earnings profile  acts as an 
incentive device. 
This  is  most  easily  seen  by  examining  WVDIFF-  10  .  .  . 
WVDIFF -  1. WVDIFF(r) is defined as WT-l -  VTPl  and is calculated 
using the relationship shown in equation (7). WVDIFF> 0 implies that 
the worker is being paid more than his marginal product, and it results 
whenever PTp  i>  PTpI+ WVDIFF -  l/SALARY is the ratio of  over- 
payment during the final year before retirement. That ratio goes from 1/6 
for workers in  the group with salary  = 9,000, tenure = 20 to 1/2 for 
workers in the group with salary = 50,000, tenure = 40. This result has a 
nice interpretation. 72  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 3.3  1980 Expected Present Value of Pension Benefits: Defined-Benefit 
Conventional Plans 
(Sample: Valid EPV-  10 . . .  EPV-0) 
Final Salary $9,000  Final Salary $15,000 
20-Year  30-Year  40-Year  20-Year  30-Year  40-Year 
Variable  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure 
EPV -  10  27,225 
EPV-9  26,911 
EPV-8  26,392 
EPV-7  25,684 
EPV-6  24,856 
EPV-5  23,868 
EPV-4  22,752 
EPV-3  21,496 
EPV-2  20,089 
EPV-1  18,699 
EPV-0  17,032 
EKAT- 10  1.617 
ERAT -  9  1.609 
ERAT -  8  1.587 
ERAT -  7  1.552 
ERAT -  6  1.509 
ERAT -  5  1.453 
ERAT -  4  1.389 
ERAT -  3  1.317 
ERAT -  2  1.234 
ERAT -  1  1.151 
ERA?' -  0  1.000 
WVDIFF- 10  121 
WVDIFF-9  220 
WVDIFF-8  330 
WVDIFF-7  424 
WVDIFF-6  557 
WVDIFF-5  693 
WVDIFF-4  857 
WVDIFF -  3  1,056 
WVDIFF -  2  1,148 
WVDIFF- 1  1,515 
NORMAL  2,911 
N  133 
50,845  73,959  35,384  66,875 
48,451  69,381  35,391  64.506 
45,905  64,904  35,116  61.886 
43,266  60,506  34,603  59.074 
40,687  56,288  33,945  56,211 
38,216  52,277  33,162  53,484 
35,594  48,218  32,058  50,344 
32,993  44,277  30,634  47,113 
30,311  40,347  28,890  43,598 
27,785  36,690  27,146  40,278 
24,839  31,624  24,846  36,166 
2.131  2.517  1.550  2.122 
2.038  2.372  1.553  2.041 
1.939  2.228  1.541  1.955 
1.835  2.085  1.519  1.865 
1.733  1.946  1.490  1.773 
1.636  1.815  1.456  1.686 
1.528  1.679  1.409  1.587 
1.421  1.547  1.349  1.485 
1.307  1.412  1.274  1.373 
1.201  1.287  1.198  1.268 
1.000  1.000  1  ,000  1.000 
922  1,764  -2  913 
1,079  1,898  116  1,111 
1,231  2,051  238  1,311 
1,323  2,164  337  1,461) 
1,394  2,264  44 1  1,539 
1,628  2,519  685  1.949 
1,776  2,691  972  2,206 
2,015  2,952  1,310  2.640 
2,087  3,022  1,441  2,743 
2,678  4,605  2.090  3.738 
4,267  5,282  4,759  6,994 



































First consider tenure: Individuals with shorter tenure are those who 
initiated their employment with the firm more recently. In the context of 
figure 3.2, those workers are  less likely to have wages which exceed their 
marginal products. As the result, the buy-out should be smaller. In fact, 
for individuals whose tenure is below fin  figure 3.2, the buy-out should 73  Pensions as Severance Pay 
Final Salary $25,000  Final Salary $50,000 
20-Year  30-Year  40-Year  20-Year  30-Year  40-Year 
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3  19,890 
306,211 





2  12,544 
195,920 
























actually be negative.  (Although this occurs in  a significant number of 
cases, it docs not occur frequently enough to make the means display an 
increasing pattern.) 
Second, high-salary workers are those most likely to be performing 
jobs where wage incentive schemes are useful. Since those may be the 74  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 3.4  1980 Expected Value of  Pension Benefits: Defined-Contribution 
Pattern Plans 
(Benefits are Independent of Final Salary) 
20-Year  30-Year  40-Year 
Variable  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure 
EPV-  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV -  4 
EPV-3 
EPV -  2 
EPV- 1 
EPV -  0 
ERAT- 10 
ERAT -  9 
ERAT -  8 
ERAT -  7 
ERAT -  6 
ERAT -  5 
ERAT -  4 
ERAT -  3 
ERAT -  2 
ERAT -  1 
ERAT -  0 
WVDIFF-  10 
WVDIFF -  9 
WVDIFF -  8 
WVDIFF -  7 
WVDIFF -  6 
WVDIFF- 5 
WVDIFF -  4 
WVDIFF -  3 
WVDIFF -  2 
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38 
jobs which are  most difficult to monitor, a large penalty in the form of lost 
earnings is  likely  to be an integral part of  the optimal compensation 
profile for these workers. 
These points are also supported by consideration of  table 3.4, which 
relates to pattern plan workers. It is also true that the general tendency is 
for the pension value to decline with age of retirement. But the decline 
does not seem to be as pronounced for these employees as for those with 75  Pensions as Severance Pay 
conventional plans. In fact, for those with only 20 years of experience at 
normal  retirement, the means of WVDIFF -  10, WVDIFF -  9, and 
WVDIFF -  8 are actually positive, reflecting location in terms of  figure 
3.2 before’f. Since most of  these workers are blue-collar workers where 
more direct  monitoring is possible,  it is not surprising that the wages 
conform  more to  marginal  product  for  these  workers  than  for  their 
higher-level counterparts. 
Finally, table 3.5 reports defined-contribution plans. We hesitate to 
draw any significant conclusions from this table for two reasons. First, 
there are so few observations. Second, the Bankers’ Trust studies do not 
really report the appropriate information for defined-contribution plans, 
so these calculations are more likely to be a function of  interpretations 
made by them and by me. The one obvious feature is that definitionally a 
defined-contribution plan cannot decline in present value with  age of 
retirement because the worker is always entitled to the present value of 
his contributions. Since contributions are never negative, that value must 
grow with age of retirement (although not necessarily at the same rate). 
It is also true that pensions associated with retirement after the normal 
age should follow the same pattern of  decline with  age. Most  of  the 
sample was subject to mandatory retirement, but 13 conventional plans 
did  allow  the worker  to elect  to remain  beyond  the date of  normal 
retirement. Table 3.6 presents information on those individuals. Since 
the pattern is  similar across salary and tenure groups, we only report 
those calculations for a representative group with salary  = 25,000 and 
tenure = 30. The pattern of  declining pension values is the same and 
smooth both before and after normal retirement. 
It is interesting that this group for which there is no mandatory retire- 
ment has more steeply declining pensions than the group which does not 
distinguish on the basis of  mandatory retirement. Compare ERAT(r) in 
table 3.6 with that for the corresponding group (salary = 30,000, tenure 
= 30) in tables 3.3-3.5 and it is clear that pensions decline more rapidly in 
table 3.6. This suggests that reductions in pensions are an alternative to 
mandatory retirement.’ 
The 1975 cross section provides a basis for comparison. Results for the 
representative group are reported in table 3.7. In comparing these values 
with those for the appropriate groups in tables 3.3-3.5  two things stand 
out. First, for pattern plans, the pensions are higher in the 1980 cross 
section  than  in  the  1975 cross section,  while  the  reverse  is  true for 
conventional plans.  Second, the decline  in  pension  value  with  age of 
retirement is sharper in  1975 than in  1980 for pattern plans while the 
reverse is true for conventional plans. We defer attempts to explain these 
findings until after discussion of  the matched sample because these differ- 
ences may simply reflect random sampling variation across firms rather 
than trends over time. 76  Edward P.  Lazear 
Tahle 3.5  1980 Expected Present Value of Pension Benefits: 
Defined-Contribution Conventional Plans 
(Sample: Valid EPV -  10 . . .  EPV -  0) 
Final Salary $9,000  Final Salary $15.000 
20-Year  30-Year  40-Year  20-Year  30-Year  40-Year 
Variable  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure 
EPV -  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV -  4 
EPV -  3 
EPV -  2 
EPV-  I 
EPV -  0 
ERAT-  10 
ERAT -  9 
ERAT -  8 
ERAT -  7 
ERAT -  6 
ERA?'- 5 
ERAT -  4 
ERAT -  3 
ERAT -  2 
ERAT -  1 
ERAT -  0 
WVDIFF -  10 
WVDIFF -  9 
WVDIFF -  8 
WVDIFF -  7 
WVDIFF -  6 
WVDIFF -  5 
WVDIFF-4 
WVDIFF -  3 
WVDIFF -  2 
WVDIFF-  1 
NORMAL 
N 
12,673  25.346  38,019  18,342  36.685  S5,028 
14,915  28,475  42,035  21,588  41.214  60,840 
17,256  31,636  46,016  24,975  45.789  66.602 
19,670  34,800  49,931  28,469  50.369  72.269 
22,131  37,940  53,749  32.033  54,913  77.794 
24,615  41,025  57,435  35.627  59.379  83.130 
26,280  42,705  59.130  38,037  61,810  85.584 
27,865  44.257  60,649  40.332  64,056  87,781 
28,500  44,334  60,168  41,251  64,168  87,086 
28,995  44,255  59,516  41,966  64,054  86,142 
29,344  44.016  58,689  42,472  63,708  84,944 
0.431  0.575  0.647  0.431  0.575  0.647 
0.508  0.646  0.716  0.508  0.646  0.716 
0.588  0.718  0.784  0.588  0.718  0.784 
0.670  0.790  0.850  0.670  0.790  0.850 
0.754  0.861  0.915  0.754  0.861  0.915 
0.838  0.932  0.978  0.838  0.932  0.978 
0.895  0.970  1.007  0.895  0.970  1.007 
0.949  1.005  1.033  0.949  1  .005  1.033 
0.971  1.007  1.025  0.971  1.007  1.025 
0.988  1.005  1.014  0.988  1.005  1.014 
1.000  1  .000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
-864  -1,206  -1,548  -1,251  -  1.745  -2.240 
-  992  -  1.340  -  1,688  -  1,436  -  1,940  -  2,443 
-1,126  -1,476  -  1,826  -1,629  -2,136  -2,643 
-  1,263  -1,611  -1.958  -1,828  -2,331  -2.835 
-1.401  -1.741  -2,081  -2,028  -2,520  -3.012 
-  1,033  -  1,043  -  1,052  -  1,496  -  1,509  -  1,523 
-  1,082  -  I .059  -  1,036  -  1.567  -  1,534  -  1,500 
-  477  -  58  360  -  690  -  84  522 
-  408  65  539  -591  94  780 
-317  217  752  -  459  314  1.088 
4.560  6,840  9.120  6,600  9.900  13,200 
1  1  1  I  1  1 
The one obvious feature is again that the expected present value of 
pension benefits declines with increases in the age of  retirement. Both 
years provide strong support of that conclusion. Again, this is consistent 
with  the idea that pensions function as severance pay in  an efficient 
compensation scheme. 77  Pensions as  Severance Pay 
Final Salary $25,000  Final Salary $50,000 
20-Year  30-Year  40-Year  20-Year  30-Year  40-Year 
Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure  Tenure 
79,855 
74,546 
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~  3.030 
-2,561 
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-3,681 
-  3.121 
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-  2,244 
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-3,817 
-  4,072 
-  4,301 
-  3.393 
-  3,436 
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~  1,898 
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-5,956 
-  5,484 
-  5,745 
-4,864 
-4,919 

























48  1 
-  2,887 
-  6,373 
-6,830 
-  7.252 
-  6,401 
-  6,583 
-  5,213 
-5,121 
-  4,863 
37,555 
3 
There are some obvious institutional differences  between the 1980 
period and 1975. The most obvious is  that the primary social security 
benefit, against which many benefit formulas are offset, increased  be- 
tween 1975 and 1980. In order to determine the effect of  social security on 
the calculations, the 1980 analysis was repeated, plugging in the 1975 78  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 3.6  1980 Expected Present Value of Pension Benefits: Defined-Benefit 
Conventional Plans 
(Sample: Valid EPV-  10 through EPV + 10) 
Salary = $25,000, Tenure = 30 Years 
Variable  Value  Variable  Value 
EPV  ~  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV  ~  4 
EPV -  3 
EPV -  2 
EPV-  1 
EPV -  0 
EPV+ 1 
EPV i  2 
EPV +  3 
€PV +  4 
EPV +  5 
EPV +  6 
EPV +  7 
EPV +  8 
EPV +  9 
EPV + 10 






















ERAT-  10 
ERAT -  9 
ERAT  ~  8 
ERAT -  7 
ERAT -  6 
ERAT -  5 
ERAT -  4 
ERAT -  3 
ERAT -  2 
ERAT -  1 
ERAT -  0 
ERAT  + 1 
ERAT i  2 
ERAT i  3 
ERAT  +  4 
ERAT  +  5 
ERAT  +  6 
ERAT  + 7 
ERAT  +  8 
ERAT  + 9 






















primary social security formula. Since that value was lower than the 1980 
value, pensions increased. That is, some benefit formulas usually subtract 
some fraction of  social security benefits from pension payments. Over 
time the amount subtracted has increased. Table 3.8 (col. 2) presents the 
results for the representative group (salary  = 25,000, tenure  = 30). 
Pension  benefits  for  1980 in column 2 with  the 1975 social security 
formula are about 7% higher  than  those using  the  1980 formula  for 
conventional plans. Although it is difficult to state the increase in primary 
social security benefits as a scalar, for the average worker that increase 
amounted to 68%. Thus the “elasticity”  of the mean of pension benefits 
with respect to social security benefits is 0.1. It is less than one primarily 
for two  reasons:  First,  not  all  plans  offset  social  security  payments. 
Second, even those that do offset benefits do not do so fully. No pattern 
plans had social security offset provisions. 
A general point  is that, because  of  the way that benefits  are offset 
against social security primary benefits, any change in those benefits has 
major impacts on pensions and therefore on retirement and tax revenues. 
We do not explore those implications here. 79  Pensions as Severance Pay 
Table 3.7  1975 Expected Present Value of Pension Benefits 
(Sample: Valid EPV -  10 . .  .  EPV -  0) 
Group 
Defined Benefits 
Variable  Conventional  Pattern  Contribution 
Defined 
EPV -  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV -  4 
EPV  ~  3 
EPV -  2 
EPV-  I 
EPV -  0 
ERAT -  10 
ERAT  ~  9 
ERAT -  8 
ERAT-7 
ERAT -  6 
ERAT-5 
ERAT -  4 
ERAT -  3 
ERAT -  2 




































































The rate of  inflation, wage growth, and nominal interest rates were 
different in  1980 than they were in 1975. In fact, one could argue that 
earnings growth of 5% per year for old workers and a nominal rate of 
interest of 15% are more reasonable. Column 3 of  table 3.8 reports the 
results on the 1980 data using these assumptions. 
Although the values  change somewhat, the qualitative conclusions 
remain essentially unchanged. Pension values decline significantly with 
age. Incidentally, the reason that values are so much lower for conven- 
tional plans under the revised assumptions is that wage growth of 5% 
implies that an individual  who  retires  10 years early  has a salary  of 
$15,348 rather than $25,000. Since conventional plans are contingent on 
final salary, benefits fall. At normal retirement, values are lower because 
of  higher discount rates. Only the latter consideration affects pattern 
plans, causing their decline to be steepened substantially. The reasoning 
is not quite so straightforward, however, since these are means of  highly 
nonlinear functions.5 
Finally, as a last check on the robustness of the results, the analysis was Table 3.8  1980 Expected Present Value of Pensions: Comparative Analysis 
(Sample: Valid EPV-  10 . .  .  EPV-0) 
Salary = $25,000, Tenure = 30 Years 
Defined-Benefit Conventional Plan 
Wage Growth  = 0 
r  =  .1  r  = .1  r  = .15  r  = .05 
Social Security = 1980 
Wage Growth  = 0 
Social Security = 1975 
Wage Growth  = 5% 
Social Security = 1980 
Wage Growth  = 0 
Social Security = 1980 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EPV -  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV -  4 
EPV -  3 
EPV -  2 
EPV -  1 
EPV  ~  0 
ERAT -  10 
ERAT -  9 
ERAT -  8 
ERAT -  7 
ERAT  ~  6 
ERAT -  5 
ERAT -  4 
ERAT -  3 
ERAT -  2 
ERAT- 1 
ERAT  ~  0 
N = 144 
107,585 


























































































144 Table 3.9  1980 Expected Present Value of Pensions: Comparative Analysis 
(Sample: Valid EPV -  10 . .  .  EPV -  0) 
Salary  = $25,000, Tenure = 30 Years 
Defined-Benefit Pattern Plan 
Wage Growth = 0 
r  =  .I  r  =  .I  r  = .15  r  = .05 
Social Security = 1980 
Wage Growth = 0 
Social Security = 1975 
Wage Growth = 5% 
Social Security = 1980 
Wage Growth = 0 
Social Security = 1980 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EPV -  10  40.65 1  40,651  48,189  37,328 
EPV -  9  40.103  40,103  45,650  38.291 
EPV -  8  39.296  39,296  42,961  39,011 
EPV -  7  38,262  38.262  40,178  39,489 
EPV -  6  37.03 1  37,031  37.353  39,728 
EPV -  5  36,164  36,164  35,134  40.201 
EPV  ~  3  32,716  32,716  29,326  39,314 
EPV-2  30,752  30,752  26,481  38,447 
EPV- 1  28,767  28,767  23,797  37,358 
EPV -  0  26,876  26,876  21,379  36,247 
ERAT -  10  1.491  1.491  2.222  1.01s 
ERAT -  9  1.473  1.473  2.109  1.043 
ERAT -  8  1.446  1.446  1.988  1.064 
ERAT -  7  1.410  1.410  1.862  1.079 
ERAT-6  1.367  1.367  1.733  1.087 
ERAT -  5  1.334  1.334  1.629  1.100 
€RAT -  4  1.274  1.274  1.494  1.092 
ERAT -  3  1.210  1.210  1.364  1.079 
ERAT -  2  1.140  1.140  1.234  1.056 
ERAT -  1  1.068  1.068  1.111  1.028 
ERAT -  0  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
N = 38 
EPV -  4  34,485  34,485  32,180  39,859 82  Edward P.  Lazear 
repeated under the assumption that the nominal interest rate was only 
5%. Column 4 of table 3.8 contains those results. 
With a nominal interest rate of 5%, the decline in pension value does 
not occur until about 6 years before normal retirement for the representa- 
tive group. However, for groups with longer tenure (=40) the decline 
occurs throughout the period for conventional plans and during the last 9 
years for pattern plans. Moreover, in 1980 a nominal discount rate of 5% 
is surely well below the feasible range since short rates were above 20% 
and 30-year mortgage rates were around 16%.  It is difficult to believe that 
5% was the anticipated discount rate. 
3.2.3  The Matched  Sample 
Any of  the differences  noted  above may  have  been  the result  of 
random differences in the cross section rather than true time variations. 
To eliminate that source of confusion, 70 plans have been matched across 
the two years. This section reports findings based on that sample. The 
results are presented in table 3.10. 
The major changes occured for pattern plans. In the matched sample, 
there was an increase in pension values of about 50% for normal retire- 
ment and over 100% for retirement 10 years early. Since pattern plans are 
independent of final salary, it is not surprising that their values should 
increase  in  nominal  terms over the period. However, two  points  are 
interesting. First,  certainly for early retirement, but  even  for normal 
retirement the increase probably exceeds the increase in prices so that 
some of  the gain is real, not nominal.  Second, the decline in pension 
benefits with early retirement seems to have steepened sharply over the 
5-year period, reflected in the 100 + % gain for early and only 50 +  o/o gain 
for normal retirement. 
Again, this may reflect a substitution of pension reductions for manda- 
tory retirement in light of changes in the Age Discrimination in Employ- 
ment Act. Of  course, if pensions acted perfectly as an efficient severance 
pay device there would be no need for mandatory retirement at all. The 
inability  to induce  both  efficient  layoffs  and  quitting  simultaneously 
provides a role for mandatory retirement and its restriction works in the 
direction of inducing more worker-initiated  separations. 
The  results  for  conventional  plans  suggest  a  different  pattern. 
Although differences are small, the benefits have, if anything, declined 
over time. This should not be taken at face value. More than this decline 
can be attributed to changes in social security. The maximum decline 
here is less than 5%  and the mean decline due to social security  was 
estimated at 7%. But more important is that conventional plans depend 
on final salary which increases over time with inflation. This table makes 
comparisons based on equality of salary in nominal terms. But using the 83  Pensions as Severance Pay 
Table 3.10  Matched Data: Pension Values 
(Sample: Valid EPV -  10 . . .  EPV -  0) 
Salary = $25,000, Tenure = 30 Years 
Years before 
Normal Retirement  EPV80  EPV75  EPV80 -  EPV75 
EPV -  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV -  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV -  4 
EPV -  3 
EPV -  2 
EPV-  1 
EPV -  0 
N  = 19 
EPV -  10 
EPV -  9 
EPV  ~  8 
EPV -  7 
EPV -  6 
EPV -  5 
EPV  ~  4 
EPV -  3 
EPV-2 
EPV-  1 













































-  2,399 
-  1,261 
-  290 
-  1,581 
-  654 
-2,902 
-  2,649 
-  3,832 
-  3,355 
-  2,618 











information in tables 3.3-3.5  we can adjust the pension benefits to take 
this into account. 
At tenure =  30, an increase in salary from $25,000 to $50,000 increases 
normal retirement value by (135,577 -  63,165)/63,165, or 114%. There- 
fore we can estimate that each dollar increase in final salary at tenure = 
30 increases normal retirement pension value by  $1.14. If  the average 
final salary in these firms grew say 30% over the 5-year period, normal 
pension value would be expected to increase from $61,907 in  1975 to 
(61,232)(1.30)(1.14)  = $90,745 in  1980. This would be  an increase of 
47%. This increase is about the same as that for pattern plans over the 
same period. 
A similar exercise can be performed  to correct the present value of 
retirement 10 years early. Under the same assumptions, this results in an 
estimated pension value of  143,886 in 1980 based on the 1975 salary of 84  Edward  P.  Lazear 
$25,000. This is an increase of  40’%,, so the steepening of  the decline in 
pension  values  for pattern  plans  does not seem to be duplicated  for 
conventional plans.‘’ 
Summarizing, pattern  plans on average  pay  50%  more at normal 
retirement and 100% more on retirement 10 years early than they did in 
197.5. In both years and under any reasonable assumptions. the expected 
present value of  pensions tends to decline with increases in the age of 
retirement. 
3.3  An Alternative Explanation and Other Issues 
Throughout the model it was assumed that workers were risk neutral. 
However, if  workers are risk averse, then another explanation for the 
decline in  pension  value with  age of  retirement is  available. When a 
worker begins employment, he may not know whether or not he will 
become ill and be forced to retire before the normal age. Because illness 
is a bad event, workers may wish to insure against that contingency by 
paying higher pensions to early retirees. 
At  some levels, this story is not inconsistent with the model. Equations 
(1)-(7)  would have to be modified to take utility rather than alternative 
use of  time into account. But the pension still acts as severance pay and 
induces workers to leave when  appropriate. “Appropriate” carries  a 
different meaning, however. Now, workers cannot be induced to leave if 
and only if the alternative use of  time exceeds the value of  the worker to 
the firm. To do so destroys the role of  severance pay as an insurance 
device. This well-known  result  appears in  many places,’ but its point 
carries  with it two implications for this analysis. First, severance  pay does 
not induce efficient separation in the sense of a first best, perfect informa- 
tion optimum. Second,  and as  the result, the decline in pension value with 
retirement age is not an accurate measure of  the difference between wage 
and  marginal product. In fact, it overstates  that value because some of the 
payment for early retirement is insurance. 
There are a  number of  arguments which suggest that the insurance 
story  is somewhat  less plausible. First, there are  other forms of insurance, 
some provided by the firm and others by a third party, which seem to  be 
set up explicitly to handle these contingencies. Health insurance and, 
more to the  point, disability insurance perform exactly those functions. It 
is not clear why a declining pension value should be required to play the 
same role. 
Second, if pensions act as insurance, one  would think that there would 
be no  reason  to prevent workers from taking them  early. But most 
pension plans severely limit the age of early retirement. This is not true in 
general for health insurance and disability insurance. If pensions are an 85  Pensions as Severance Pay 
incentive device, it is easier to rationalize the unwillingness to pay pen- 
sions to early retirees. 
Third, most pensions that are based on salary use the final few years’ 
salary  as the basis  of  computation. If  insurance were  the motive,  a 
lifetime average which more closely reflects expected permanent income 
would be appropriate. In fact, with insurance a case could be made for a 
negative  relationship between final salary and pension, given lifetime 
income, because of the inability of  the older disabled worker to adjust to 
the fall in income. 
Fourth, the decline in  pension  values  is  steepest  for  high-income, 
white-collar workers who have conventional rather than pattern plans. 
Yet one might  argue that it is the blue-collar workers who have both 
riskier jobs and fewer alternative forms of insurance. Although insurance 
may be a partial motive for pension values which decline with age of 
retirement, it seems difficult to believe that this is a major factor in the 
explanation. 
3.4  Conclusion 
The expected present value of pension benefits generally declines with 
the age of retirement. This phenomenon is easily explained if one views 
the pensions as a form of  severance pay rather than as a tax-deferred 
savings account. Further, the real value of pension benefits has remained 
constant or increased in real terms over the period between 1975 and 1980 
even though the same is probably not true for older workers’ real earn- 
ings. Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that higher pensions for 
early retirement are being used as a substitute for mandatory retirement 
clauses in labor contracts. 
Notes 
I.  This analysis marries the models presented in Lazear (1981) and Hall and Lazear 
2. A more general formulation allows the severance payment to vary with the identity of 
the party who initiates the separation. Hall and Lazear (1982) consider this case and discuss 
its drawbacks. 
3. That the entire remaining  stream must  be  examined is  recognized  in  Fields and 
Mitchell (1981). Bulow (1981) also points out (as my calculations implicitly do) that the 
“true” current wage also includes the value of changing the pension as the result of  working 
that period. 
(1982). 
4. See also Burkhauser and Quinn  (1981). 
5. E.g., for  some ages the mean rises even though no one plan ever rose. The  nonlineari- 
ties make some plans fall by  less than others. 
6. There was only one matched defined-contribution plan. 
7. To name a few,  see Azariadis (1980). Arnott and Stiglitz (1981). Green (1981), Green 
and Kahn (1981), Grossman and Hart (1981a, 1981b). 86  Edward P.  Lazear 
Comment  David A. Wise 
Through a substantial  coding  effort,  Lazear  has computeriLed  the 
stipulations of a number of pension plans. Having done this, he has been 
able to compare the provisions of the plans with the predictions suggested 
by his theory. Although the idea is straightforward, the implementation 
of  it is not simple, and, indeed, the data set that Lazear has created is 
interesting in its own right. The data are consistent with the theory. The 
chapter gives us a major  piece of  information: once the age of  early 
retirement is reached, annual “earnings” in the form of pension benefits 
decline with additional years of employment, according to the provisions 
of a large group of pension plans. 
Without Lazear’s theory, I believe a standard prediction would be that 
workers are paid more than their marginal products early in their working 
lives, then less than their marginal products, and finally more than their 
marginal products toward the end of  their working careers. That they are 
paid more late in life creates an incentive for them to continue working. 
Mandatory retirement is one way of  bringing overpayment to an end. In 
any case, firms under this scenario have an incentive to get older workers 
to retire before the mandatory retirement age. What Lazear has added to 
this story is that judicious selection of pension parameters could theoreti- 
cally tend to produce more efficient quitting. This is done by reducing 
retirement benefits from one year to the next in such a way as to just offset 
the difference between the wage rate and the marginal product during 
that year. The net marginal wage faced by  the worker is  equal to his 
marginal product, and thus it leads to efficient quitting decisions. Guided 
by this interpretation, Lazear’s data seem to indicate that the divergence 
between wage and marginal product in these late years increases with 
age. At least this seems to be true for persons on defined-benefit plans. 
However, it seems not generally to be the case with respect to defined- 
contribution plans. 
Again, using Lazear’s interpretation of the data, it also turns out that 
the difference between wage and marginal product is greater for workers 
with long tenure with the firm and also for those with higher salaries. The 
possibility that short tenured workers may be paid less than their mar- 
ginal product seems plausible to me, but the reasoning for higher-salary 
workers is to me more questionable. Lazear has argued that relative to 
blue-collar workers it is more difficult to monitor the performance of 
higher-salary workers and therefore in part the higher salary is a neces- 
sary incentive. On the other hand, in my limited experience with a large 
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corporation, it was made clear to me that the highest-paid workers were 
the easiest to monitor and indeed that the firm cared relatively little about 
managers below middle management and would not normally take steps 
to fire them even if  they were performing poorly. On the other hand, the 
claim was that the performance of  people at higher levels of management 
was  obvious from  the performance  of  their divisions  and that these 
people were paid more in part because their marginal contributions to the 
firm were potentially high. Also, it was claimed that these people would 
be dismissed if  their performance did not live up to expectations. 
Now let me say a bit more about the possible interpretations of  the 
data. I agree with Lazear that the data seem to be inconsistent with a 
savings motivation for pensions, at least in the main. 
I am not so sure, however,  that the data are inconsistent  with  an 
insurance motive for pensions. People who retire early often say that they 
do so because of  health status. Presumably persons believe that should 
poor health necessitate early retirement they would need higher benefits 
than if  this contingency were not to arise. There are, of  course, other 
insurance schemes that are more directly related to health than general 
retirement plans are, but to get disability insurance one presumably has 
to demonstrate disability. Declining health status may mitigate against 
working, yet a person may not be disabled in a strict sense and thus may 
want the added insurance of  a retirement plan. There is, of  course, a 
moral hazard problem when retirement benefits are allowed to act as 
insurance, which is, of course, what disability verification tries to guard 
against. 
This leads me to wonder how Lazear’s theory  relates to individual 
differences among workers. Is the same scheme to apply to all? It does 
not seem to me that existing pension plans can reduce benefits in accord- 
ance with individual differences in marginal product versus wage. I am 
reminded of  this difference because of the experience of  a large Boston 
corporation that recently  wanted  to reduce  its  work  force. The firm 
presumably set out to do this by a judicious selection of  severance pay 
determined worker by  worker, or at least  based on  individual  work 
histories. After the fact, the firm apparently found that their incentive 
scheme was not-at  least to the extent that it wished-encouraging those 
that they wanted to retain to stay, and those that they did not want to 
retain to leave. I wonder how pension plans in the aggregate could be 
expected to perform in this respect. 
It is also interesting that Lazear’s data seem to be consistent with his 
theory  with  respect to defined-benefit  plans  but the data on defined- 
contribution plans apparently are not. Does this mean that firms with 
defined-contribution plans  have different lifetime salary structures  of 
different  implicit contracts with workers or that they have different work 
settings such that appropriate incentive schemes are different from those 88  Edward P. Lazear 
that apply in firms with defined-benefit plans? For example, construction 
workers may typically have defined-contribution plans while auto firm 
employees may have defined-benefit plans. Since the normal job tenure 
of  the two  groups  is  typically  very  different,  the incentives  of  their 
pension plans might also be expected to differ. Also, the plans selected by 
Lazear for analysis are those that allow early retirement. Could it be that 
firms that allow early retirement are those that would like to dismiss some 
older workers and thus have pension plans that are consistent with this 
goal? 
Along these lines, I think it would be interesting to compare salary 
structures in the relatively recent past, when pensions were much less 
prevalent than they are today, with salary structures that exist today. In 
particular, could one demonstrate that the divergence between wage and 
marginal  product of  older workers is  greater now than it used  to be? 
Finally, it seems to me that Lazear’s evidence suggests the advantages 
that could be gained from longitudinal microdata that match individual 
salary trajectories and turnover (quitting) with pension plan parameters. 
In summary: Lazear’s chapter has contributed  a major piece  of  in- 
formation  to our knowledge  about pension  plans.  Together with  his 
theory, this information helps us to understand  a possible role of  pen- 
sions: to encourage efficient retirement. A major portion of  the plans 
considered by Lazear do appear to be consistent with this role, although 
others apparently  are not. Thus the chapter raises several interesting 
issues for future investigation. 
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